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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On October 4, 2001, President Bush authorized the National Security Agency 
(NSA) to collect two different types of bulk information:  telephony and Internet 
metadata, and telephone and Internet content.1 The former gave the NSA the 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown Law.   This Article constitutes the third section of a three-part 
series on NSA surveillance under FISA.  For Part 1, see Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata 
Collection:  Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (2014), 
available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1294/; for Part 2, see Laura K. Donohue, 
Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, (2014), available 
at 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/do/search/?q=author_lname%3A%22Donohue%22%20AN
D%20author_fname%3A%22Laura%22&start=0&context=890094&sort=date_desc.. 
1 Authorization for Specified Electronic Surveillance Activities During a Limited Period to Detect 
and Prevent Acts of Terrorism Within the United States, Oct. 4, 2001, cited in OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GENERAL, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE, WORKING DRAFT 
ST-09-0002, Mar. 24, 2009, p. 1, 7-8, 11, 15, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/27/nsa-inspector-general-report-document-
data-collection [hereinafter WORKING DRAFT].  The Obama Administration has publicly confirmed 
the inclusion of Internet and telephony metadata, and telephony content, as part of the President’s 
Surveillance Program (PSP), but not Internet content.  See Press Release, Director of National 
Intelligence, DNI Announces the Declassification of the Existence of Collection Activities 
Authorized by President George W. Bush Shortly After the Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Dec. 
21, 2013), available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-
2013/991-dni-announces-the-declassification-of-the-exisitence-of-collection-activities-authorized-
by-president-george-w-bush-shortly-after-the-attacks-of-september-11,2001 [hereinafter 
Declassification Press Release]; Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security 
Agency, Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 08-cv-4373-JSW (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2013), available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/2013/12/21/fleisch2013jewelshubert.pdf (using language identical to DNI 
press release)[hereinafter Fleisch Declaration].  See also OLC-132, Memorandum from a Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel to the counsel to the President, regarding 
a request from the White House for OLC’s views regarding what legal standards might govern the 
                                                        
 ability to identify terrorist-related activity through contact chaining—i.e., the 
process of building a network graph that modeled communication patterns of 
targets and their associates. 2  The latter provided raw intelligence. 3  Within a 
month, the President’s Surveillance Program, renewed thereafter at 30-60 day 
intervals, became operational.4    
Over the next twelve years, the contours of—and the legal basis for—the 
classified program and its component parts shifted.  The Administration initially 
grounded PSP in the President’s Article II Commander-in-Chief authorities, the 
2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), and the War Powers 
Resolution.5  Gradually, key portions of the program were either eliminated or 
moved to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).6  Critical statutory 
changes contributed to the process.7  Despite these changes, calls for reform of 
FISA persisted.8  For the most part, however, they met with little success. 
It was not until Edward Snowden’s releases, in June 2013 et seq., the court-
ordered release of documents in a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) case, and 
the declassification of additional documents by the Obama Administration, that 
calls for significant reform took hold.9  With FISA considered by Congress to be 
use of certain intelligence methods to monitor communications by potential terrorists, Oct. 4, 2001, 
noted by Second Redacted Declaration of Steven G. Bradbury, Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of 
Justice, 511 F. Supp. 2d 56 (D.D.C. 2007), available at 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/safefree/aclu_v_doj_2nd_declaration_steven_bradbury
.pdf.  
2 WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 13. 
3 Id. at 15.  
4 WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 11 (“Within 30 days, the PSP was fully operational . . . Private 
sector partners began to send telephony and Internet content to NSA in October 2001.  They began 
to send telephony and Internet metadata to NSA as early as November 2001”).  
5 See, e.g., President’s Radio Address, THE WHITE HOUSE, Dec. 17, 2005, available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html; U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (Jan. 19, 2006), available at  
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf; Letter from William E. Moschella, 
Assistant Attorney General to  The Hon. Pat Roberts, Chair, Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, The Hon. John D. Rockefeller, IV, Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, The Hon. Peter Hoekstra, Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
U.S. House of Representatives, and the Hon. Jane Harman, Ranking Minority Member, Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives (Dec. 22, 2005), available at 
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj122205.pdf. 
6 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, codified at 50 
U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2006).  See also discussion, Part II, infra. 
7 See Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-55, § 2, 121 Stat. 553. (Aug. 5, 2007) (amending 
FISA, § 105B(a)(1)-(5)), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805b (2006)); FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (July 10, 2008). 
8 For thoughtful and important contributions to FISA reform following the FAA, see William C. 
Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA:  Of Needles in Haystacks, 88 TEXAS L. REV., 1633 
(2010); David S. Kris, Modernizing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act:  Progress to Date 
and Work Still to Come, in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR:  AN AGENDA FOR REFORM, 217 
(Benjamin Wittes, ed., 2009); Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 245 (2008); Orin S. Kerr, Updating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 225 (2010); Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance Law, U. CHI. L. 
REV. 287 (2008). 
9  See, e.g., Elec. Frontier Found. v Dep’t of Justice, No. 4:11-cv-05221-YGR (N.D. Cal. 2013); 
Declassification Press Release, supra note 1.  See also Aamer Madhani, DNI releases more 
documents to justify NSA surveillance, USA TODAY, Dec. 21, 2013, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/12/21/dni-nsa-documents-bulk-data/4157877/ 
(“In the face of growing skepticism over the National Security Agency’s practice of collecting bulk 
phone and Internet records, the director of national intelligence on Saturday declassified several 
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 the sole means via which intelligence agencies could collect information on U.S. 
persons within the United States, attention was drawn to the legal sufficiency of 
the programs under the statute and the First and Fourth Amendments, and ways 
in which the legislative language could be altered to take account of new and 
emerging technologies, the needs of the intelligence community, civil liberties, 
and citizens’ constitutional right to privacy. Dozens of reform initiatives are now 
on the table.  The Administration has indicated a willingness to work with 
Congress to alter the statutory framing, and the legislature is poised to take up the 
issue of FISA reform.  
What has been missing from the discussion is a comprehensive view of ways 
in which reform could be given effect—i.e., a taxonomy of potential reform 
efforts. This Article seeks to fill the gap. The aim is to deepen the conversation 
about potential approaches to foreign intelligence gathering, to allow fuller 
discussion of what a comprehensive reform package could contain, and to place 
specific reforms that are currently being advocated within a broader, over-
arching framework. 
The Article begins by addressing (to the extent that the information is 
publicly available) the legal underpinnings of PSP and its progeny. It outlines the 
components of the original program and their transfer to FISA. Part II ends with 
an overview of the state of play with regard to current calls for reform.   
Part III focuses on how technology has altered the types of information 
available, as well as methods of transmission and storage. It suggests that we 
now find ourselves in a world in which five primary types of information are 
available: personal, transactional, relational, locational, and content. Set against 
the five categories are six methods of access, transmission, and storage: 
audio/visual observation, communications networks, papers, hard drives and 
independent electronic devices, remote servers and cloud technologies, and social 
media. The purpose of this discussion is to step back from how foreign 
intelligence has traditionally been conceived, to consider the world as we now 
find it.  
Part IV builds on the previous section by developing a taxonomy for how a 
statutory approach to foreign intelligence gathering could be given force. It 
divides foreign intelligence gathering into two categories: front-end collection 
and back-end analysis and use. Each category contains a counterpoise structured 
to ensure the appropriate exercise of Congressionally-mandated authorities. For 
the front-end, this means balancing the manner of collection with requirements 
for approval. For the back-end, this means offsetting implementation with 
transparency and oversight.  
The taxonomy sub-divides for both parts of each category. The first half of 
the front-end framework, the manner of collection, proposes six sections. The 
first two divisions draw from Part III, emphasizing (1) the disparate types of 
information available and (2) distinct methods of access, transmission, and 
storage. To this are added (3) the form in which information is transferred, (4) the 
agency obtaining the information, (5) the target about whom information is 
sought, (6) the source of the data, and (7) the location of the material.  
The second half of the front-end framework, requirements for approval, 
looks at four areas: (1) the entity approving the collection of information, (2) how 
documents detailing the program.  The latest declassification of documents comes during a week in 
which a federal judge ruled the NSA’s bulk collection was likely unconstitutional and a White 
House task force questioned the effectiveness of the program.”). 
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 this entity is constructed, (3) the scope of the approval, (4) verification, and (5) 
potential emergency exceptions.  
Turning to the back-end framework, the Article addresses implementation as 
manifest through (1) analysis, (2) use, (3) retention, and (4) transfer of 
information. The second half of the back-end, transparency and oversight, 
emphasizes (1) who reports, (2) what is reported, (3) to whom such reports are 
made, (4) penalties for violations, and (5) alternative reporting channels. 
Part V concludes by noting that the purpose of building the typology is to 
provide a framework for different considerations to be taken into account in 
constructing a comprehensive reform package. This Article does not take a 
substantive position on the categories put forward. Instead, it identifies potential 
ways to proceed in developing an approach to foreign intelligence gathering that 
is cognizant of new and emerging technologies, as well as other, competing 
needs, such as intelligence gathering, threat assessments, economic stability, civil 
liberties, the right to privacy, and protections against the misuse of information.  
II. LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS 
 
From the beginning, information about the existence of, and the legal basis for, 
the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP) was tightly controlled.10 Subjected to 
broader scrutiny, PSP’s legal grounding altered. Eventually, the constituent 
portions of PSP were either eliminated or transferred to FISA’s overarching 
framework. As more information became public, statutory and constitutional 
concerns emerged.  Central to the debate has been the sufficiency of the existing 
statutory language in light of new and emerging technologies and the First and 
Fourth Amendment implications of the current programs. Resultantly, calls for 
reform are gaining ground. 
A. The President’s Surveillance Program and its Transfer to FISA  
In March 2004, a classified review of the program by the Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) determined that there was legal support for three of the four types 
of collection included in PSP: (a) bulk telephony metadata, and the contents of 
(b) telephone and (c) Internet communications. OLC found that, in contrast to the 
three programs, the bulk Internet metadata collection appeared to be prohibited 
by the terms of FISA and Title III.11 Based on OLC’s finding, President George 
W. Bush rescinded the authority to collect bulk Internet metadata and gave the 
NSA one week to terminate the program. DOJ and NSA subsequently transferred 
10 See, e.g., WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 22 (“As directed by the White House, access to the 
original Presidential authorization and subsequent renewals was tightly controlled.”); Id. at p. 21 
(noting that “The NSA did not have access to the early DoJ Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
opinions supporting the Attorney General’s statement that the PSP was legal.”); Memorandum 
from George W. Bush, the White House, to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, 
the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of 
Federal Bureau of Investigation of Investigation, Re: Disclosures to the Congress (Oct. 5, 2001), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/bush/gwb100501.html (directing members of the Cabinet to 
limit any disclosures to Congress regarding classified or sensitive law enforcement information to 
the Gang of Eight).  See also WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 25 (noting briefings only to the 
Gang of Eight). 
11 OLC apparently issued three opinions on this matter:  Mar. 15, 2004, May 6, 2004, and July 16, 
2004.  WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 37. 
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 the process to FISA’s Pen Register/Trap and Trace Provisions (PRTT), with the 
first order approved July 14, 2007 and renewed thereafter at 90-day intervals.12 
The program appears to have operated until December 2011, when it was 
discontinued for failure to deliver sufficient operational value to the NSA.13 
The three remaining PSP programs reviewed by OLC (bulk telephony 
metadata, and the contents of international telephone and Internet 
communications) appear to have been known only to a small number of people 
within the executive branch.  It was not until a New York Times article was 
published in December 2005 that their existence reached the public domain.14 At 
that time, only a narrow part of PSP emerged: the NSA’s interception of (at least 
some) telephone content between the United States and overseas. 15   Some 
months later, the media reported further on the collection of domestic telephony 
metadata.16 
Pressed in late 2005 and early 2006 for the legal rationale behind the 
interception of international communications, a program that the Administration 
referred to as the Terrorism Surveillance Program (TSP), the government cited 
the President’s constitutional authorities as Commander-in-Chief, the 2001 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), and the War Powers 
Resolution (WPR).17 
Congress and others offered three principal legal objections. First, that the 
legislature had intended the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which 
restricted electronic surveillance and required judicial approval for the granting 
of orders, to be the sole means via which the executive branch could conduct 
domestic surveillance for foreign intelligence and international counter-terrorism 
12 WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 38, 39; Declassification Press Release, supra note 1; Fleisch 
Declaration, supra note 1.  
13 See Declassification Press Release, supra note 1; Fleisch Declaration, supra note 1. 
14 James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
16, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
(“Months after the Sept. 11 attacks, President Bush secretly authorized the National Security 
Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States to search for evidence of 
terrorist activity without the court-approved warrants ordinarily required for domestic spying, 
according to government officials.”). See also Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, Spy Agency Mined 
Vast Data Trove, Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/24/politics/24spy.html?pagewanted=all (“The National Security 
Agency has traced and analyzed large volumes of telephone and Internet communications flowing 
into and out of the United States as part of the eavesdropping program that President Bush 
approved after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to hunt for evidence of terrorist activity, according to 
current and former government officials.”). 
15 Lichtblau and Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, supra note 10.  16 Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY, May 11, 
2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm.  See also 
Seymour M. Hersh, Listening In, NEW YORKER, May 29, 2006, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/archiva/2006/05/29/060529ta_talk_hersh.   
17 See, e.g., President’s Radio Address, THE WHITE HOUSE, Dec. 17, 2005, available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html; U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (Jan. 19, 2006), available at  
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf; Letter from William E. Moschella, 
Assistant Attorney General to  The Hon. Pat Roberts, Chair, Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, The Hon. John D. Rockefeller, IV, Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, The Hon. Peter Hoekstra, Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
U.S. House of Representatives, and the Hon. Jane Harman, Ranking Minority Member, Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives (Dec. 22, 2005), available at 
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj122205.pdf. 
Laura K. Donohue FISA Reform 5 
                                                        
 purposes. 18  FISA contemplated the advent of war, allowing a 15-day grace 
period, at the expiration of which the statute’s provisions would be in effect.19  
Second, while the AUMF gave the President the authority to “use all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons 
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks,” 
neither the legislative history nor the text of the 2001 AUMF made explicit 
reference to electronic surveillance.20  
Third, Congress (and the Courts) had previously considered and declined to 
recognize claims to Article II authority to conduct foreign intelligence gathering 
within domestic bounds absent a warrant—this had been the basis on which FISA 
had been introduced.21  
In the face of mounting public pressure, a company providing telephony 
metadata expressed concern to the NSA about the voluntary nature of the 
program, requesting that the process be, instead, one of government 
compulsion. 22  Resultantly, on May 24, 2006, the NSA transferred the bulk 
collection of telephony metadata to FISA’s tangible goods provisions in Section 
501 (as amended by USA PATRIOT Act Section 215).23 
18 During passage of FISA, some members of the House of Representatives wanted the statute to 
read that it was the “exclusive statutory” means for the Executive to conduct electronic 
surveillance, implying in the process that the President had inherent surveillance powers outside the 
statute.  The Senate rejected this notion, suggesting that if the President were to engage in 
electronic surveillance outside the parameters of FISA, on judicial review, they wanted the 
Supreme Court to treat the President’s actions as under Justice Jackson’s third category in 
Youngstown:  against the expressed intent of Congress.  The Senate view carried. See 50 U.S.C. 
§1811 et seq. 
19 50 U.S.C. §1811 (2006) (electronic surveillance); 50 U.S.C. §1829 (2006) (physical search), 50 
U.S.C. §1844 (2006) (pen/trap) (“Notwithstanding any other law, the President, through the 
Attorney General, may authorize [electronic surveillance, physical search, or pen/trap] to acquire 
foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed 15 calendar days following a declaration 
of war by Congress.”).  It provided for a 15-day grace period, to “allow time for consideration of 
any amendment to [FISA] that may be appropriate during a wartime emergency.” H.R. REP. NO. 
95-1720, at 34 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4063. At the expiry of 
the 15 days, absent any amendment, ordinary FISA provisions would have to be followed. 
Congress recognized that this had been a carefully-constructed compromise position: during the 
debates on FISA, the House of Representatives had sought a complete abatement of FISA during 
periods of declared war. The Senate objected, and the House of Representatives changed its 
position. 
20 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). 
21 In 1972, the Court held that government officials were obliged to obtain a warrant prior to 
electronic surveillance, even where domestic security might be on the line.  The court cited the 
“inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept” and the potential for abuse and the targeting 
of political dissenters, to underscore the importance of Fourth Amendment protections. United 
States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).   
22 WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 39-40. 
23 USA PATRIOT Act, Sec.215, amending FISA Sec. 501, codified at 50 USC §1861 (Access to 
certain business records for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations). For the 
original order for Verizon, see In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Telecommunications Providers] Relating to 
[REDACTED], Order, No. BR-05 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006), available at 
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf 
(released by court order as part of the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s FOIA litigation).  Note that 
the specific telecommunications company from which such records were sought were redacted, as 
well as the remaining title; however, the government also released an NSA report that provided 
more detail on the title of the Order. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., NAT’L SEC. AGENCY/CENT. 
SEC. SERV., ST-06-0018, REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT CONTROLS FOR 
IMPLEMENTING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT ORDER:  TELEPHONY BUSINESS 
Laura K. Donohue FISA Reform 6 
                                                        
 The remaining PSP collection programs, which focused on international 
telephone and Internet content, could not so easily be transferred to FISA.24 To 
do so, DOJ and NSA would have to find a legal theory to support the NSA’s 
addition and withdrawal of thousands of foreign targets for content collection.25  
The solution ultimately turned on a new definition of “facility”—no longer 
would it be understood in relation to a particular telephone number or email 
address, but instead, it became defined in a manner that included general 
gateways used for communications.26 In January 2007, FISC approved the new 
theory with regard to foreign selectors but rejected it for the domestic realm, 
signing two separate orders.27  
The former change immediately and negatively affected the number of 
foreign selectors that could be used with regard to collection.28 It also placed a 
higher administrative burden on the NSA. In April 2007, the Director of National 
Intelligence, J.M. McConnell, submitted a proposal to Congress to amend FISA 
to make it easier for the executive branch to target U.S. interests abroad.  
Four months later, Congress passed the Protect America Act (PAA), easing 
restrictions on the surveillance of foreigners where one (or both) parties were 
located overseas. 29 The statute removed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC) from supervising the interception of communications that began or 
ended in a foreign country. In its place, the Attorney General and the Director of 
National Intelligence could authorize, up to one year, the acquisition of 
communications concerning “persons reasonably believed to be outside the 
United States,” where five criteria were met.30 The PAA required the Attorney 
General to submit the targeting procedures to FISC and to certify that the 
communications to be intercepted were not purely domestic in nature.31 Once 
RECORDS (Sept. 5, 2006) (see page 94 of 1846 and 1862 Production, Mar. 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20
US.pdf. 
24 Telephone content collection came to be known as the Terrorism Surveillance Program (TSP). 
25 WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 40. 
26 WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 41. 
27 Foreign Content Order, Jan. 10, 2007 and Domestic Content Order, Jan. 10, 2007, cited in 
WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 41-42. For additional sources noting the ending of PSP in 
January 2007 see also S. REP. NO. 110-209, at 4 (2007); Letter from Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy and Senator Arlen Specter (Jan. 
17, 2007).  Other documents, however, suggest that TSP transitioned to FISA in January 2007.  
See, e.g., Declassification Press Release, supra note 1; Fleisch Declaration, supra note 1. 
28 Unlike the Foreign Content Order, the Domestic Content Order issued by FISC in January 2007 
did not have an immediate, dramatic impact on collection. Nevertheless, it retarded the process to 
the point where, by January 2009, only a single selector was directed towards collection. The FBI 
subsequently took responsibility for the domestic order before the FISC. WORKING DRAFT, supra 
note 1, at 42. 
29 Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-55, § 2, 121 Stat. 553. (Aug. 5, 2007) (amending 
FISA, § 105B(a)(1)-(5)), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805b (2006)).  
30 1. Reasonable procedures were in place for determining that the acquisition concerned persons 
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States; 2.  The acquisition did not constitute 
electronic surveillance (i.e., it did not involve solely domestic communications); 3. The acquisition 
involved obtaining the communications data from or with the assistance of a communications 
service provider who had access to communications; 4. A significant purpose of the acquisition was 
to obtain foreign intelligence information; and 5.  Minimization procedures outlined in the FISA 
would be used. Id.  
31 Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-55, § 3, 121 Stat. 552 (Aug. 5, 2007) (amending FISA 
§ 105B(c), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805c (2006).  
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 certified, FISC was required to grant the order. 32 Intended to operate for six 
months, the PAA gave retroactive immunity to service providers to insulate them 
from civil liability.33  
Congress continued the PAA until February 17, 2008,34 eventually replacing 
it with a more permanent measure: the FISA Amendments Act (FAA). 35 
Consistent with this statute, FISA Section 702 empowers the Attorney General 
and the Director of National Intelligence jointly to authorize, for up to one year, 
“the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
States to acquire foreign intelligence information.”36 FISC annually reviews the 
certification for the order, to which certain limitations apply.37 The FAA also 
brought the targeting of U.S. persons overseas, previously addressed via Section 
2.3 of Executive Order 12333, within FISA, providing greater protections for 
U.S. persons.38 
B. Reform Efforts  
 
The Snowden releases in June 2013 et seq. set off a storm of criticism of the 
NSA’s use of its authorities under FISA and the FAA.39  Forced on the defensive, 
the Obama Administration responded by declassifying FISC orders, targeting and 
32 Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-55, § 3, 121 Stat. 552 (Aug. 5, 2007) (amending FISA 
§ 105C).  Twice a year the Attorney General would be required to inform the Intelligence and 
Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate of incidents or noncompliance with the directive 
issued by the Attorney General or Director of National Intelligence, incidents of noncompliance 
with FISC-approved procedures, and the numbers of certifications or directives issued during the 
reporting period. Id. 
33 Protect America Act of 2007, §6. 
34 Various bills were proposed in the interim.  See, e.g., FISA Amendments Act of 2008, S. 2248, 
110th Cong. (2007).  
35 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (July 10, 2008).  
36 “Procedures for Targeting Certain Persons Outside the United States Other Than United States 
Persons,” Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, codified at 
50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2006).  Except as otherwise noted, section 702 mirrors the definitions adopted 
in FISA for the terms “agent of a foreign power,” “foreign intelligence information,” “foreign 
power,” and “person.” 
37 Five limitations apply to the order issued by the AG and DNI:  first, it “may not intentionally 
target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States.” § 1881b(1). 
Second, it “may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located outside the 
United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably 
believed to be in the United States.” § 1881b(2). Third, it “may not intentionally target a United 
States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.” § 1881b(3). Fourth, it 
“may not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the sender and all intended 
recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States.” § 1881b(4). 
Fifth, the collection of such information “shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the fourth 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” § 1881b(5). In exigent circumstances, the 
Attorney General and the DNI may authorize an immediate acquisition under Section 702; 
however, they must then submit a certification to the FISC as soon as practicable, but in no event 
later than seven days after they determined the existence of such exigent circumstances. 
38 The FAA required, for instance, that the government adopt targeting and minimization 
procedures for review by FISC.  The minimization procedures, in particular, restrict handling 
information concerning U.S. persons incidentally acquired under Section 702—including the 
retention and dissemination of such information. 
39 For a relatively complete list of key media reports and the Administration’s response, see 
American Civil Liberties Union, NSA Documents Released to the Public Since June 2013, available 
at https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013. 
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 minimization procedures, and other documents.40  Freedom of Information Act 
litigation initiated by the Electronic Frontier Foundation contributed further to 
the amount of information in the public domain, resulting during autumn 2013 in 
the monthly release of previously classified materials.41.  
Cases challenging the legality of these programs are working their way 
through the courts. Some, directed at FISC, seek to obtain more information 
about the programs underway.42 Others focus on the statutory and constitutional 
questions.43 It appears that, for now, the Supreme Court is content to let the cases 
work their way through the lower courts.44 It is too early to tell how these suits 
will progress—not least because of difficult issues related to standing, 
jurisdiction, and Supreme Court precedent. What is clear is that the programs are 
highly contentious, with the circuits, just nine months into the process, already 
divided.45 
Many observers suggest that the best solution to the lack of clarity 
surrounding the intelligence community’s authority to use new and emerging 
technologies to collect digital information is to amend the current statutory 
framework governing foreign intelligence and international counterterrorism 
investigations. Towards these ends, in 2013 Congress held numerous hearings,46 
40 Documents declassified by the Administration (both voluntarily and as a result of FOIA 
litigation) are located at Office of the Director of National Intelligence, IC on the Record, available 
at http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/. 
41 The Section 215 documents were released in three batches on September 10, 2013, October 28, 
2013, and November 19, 2013.  They are archived at Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), 
Transparency Project, Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, located at 
https://www.eff.org/foia/section-215-usa-patriot-act.  Further FOIA disclosures from EFF lawsuits 
related to Section 702 and an opinion of FISC from Oct. 3, 2011, which were released Aug. 21, 
2013, are located at https://www.eff.org/foia/fisc-orders-illegal-government-sureveillance. 
42 See, e.g., ACLU’s Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Motion, No. Misc. 13-02 (FISA Ct. 
2013); Yahoo’s Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Motion, No. Misc 13-05 (FISA Ct. 2013) 
(challenging the classification of secret court documents); Google’s Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court Motion, No. Misc. 13-03 (FISA Ct. 2013); Microsoft’s Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court Motion, No.Misc. 13-04 (FISA Ct. 2013); (challenging the classification of 
secret court data); Facebook’s Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Motion, No. Misc. 13-06 
(FISA Ct. 2013);  Yahoo’s second Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Motion, No. Misc. 13-
05 (FISA Ct. 2013); LinkedIn’s Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Motion, No. Misc. 13-07 
(FISA Ct. 2013); SCLU’s second Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Motion, No. Misc. 13-08 
(FISA Ct. 2013); ProPublica’s Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Motion, No. Misc. 13-09 
(FISA Ct. 2013).  
43 See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0881, 2013 WL 6598728 (D.D.C. 2013) (challenging the 
Verizon Section 215 order); Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851, 2013 WL 6571596 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(challenging the NSA’s PRISM surveillance program conducted under FISA Section 702); Am. 
Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, No. 13-CV-3994 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2013) (challenging the 
Verizon Section 215 order); Smith v. Obama, No. 2:13-CV-00257 (D. Idaho 2013) (challenging the 
Verizon Section 215 order); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, No. 13-58, 
(U.S. 2013) (challenging the Section 215 Verizon order); First Unitarian Church v. Nat’l Sec. 
Agency, No. 13-3287 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (challenging Electronic surveillance). 
44 See, e.g., In Re Electronic Privacy Information Center, No. 13-58 (U.S. 2013) (denying petition 
for a writ of mandamus). 
45 Compare, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, No. 13-CV-3994 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2013) 
(Judge Pauley rejection of government’s argument that plaintiffs lack standing, rejection of 
plaintiffs’ claims under the Administrative Procedure Act; acceptance of government statutory 
construction, and determination that Smith v. Maryland controls for Fourth Amendment purposes) 
with  Klayman v. Obama (Klayman I) No. 13-0881 (D.D.C. 2013); Klayman v. Obama (Klayman 
II), No. 13-0851 (D.D.C. 2013), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/901810-
klaymanvobama215.html. 
46 See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on FISA, 113th Cong. (Dec. 11, 2013); Senate 
Judiciary Committee Hearing on Continued Oversight of U.S. Government Surveillance 
Laura K. Donohue FISA Reform 9 
                                                        
 and members of both Houses introduced dozens of bills centered on FISA 
reform.47  2014 began in much the same manner.48 
As these reform efforts have gained momentum, the Obama Administration 
has indicated a willingness to amend the current law. In September 2013 the 
President appointed a Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies. 49  Their final report, issued in December 2013, made forty-six 
Authorities, 113th Cong. (Dec. 10, 2013); Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on NSA Spying, 
113th Cong. (Nov. 21, 2013); Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Transparency Issues, 113th 
Cong. (Nov. 13, 2013); House Intelligence Committee Hearing on FISA/NSA Program, 113th 
Cong. (Oct. 29, 2013); Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, 113th Cong. (Oct. 2, 2013); Senate 
Intelligence Committee Hearing, 113th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2013) (note classified/public sessions); 
Hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Chaired by Senator John D. Rockefeller 
IV (D-WV), Nomination of J. Patrick Rowan to be Assistant Attorney General for National 
Security, Sept. 25, 2008 (discussing Section 702); Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on NSA 
surveillance, 113th Cong. (July 31, 2013); House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
How Disclosed NSA Programs Protect Americans and Why Disclosure Aids our Adversaries, 
Chaired by Rep. Michael J. “Mike” Rogers, June 18, 2013 (testimony of Gen. Keith Alexander, 
Deputy Atton’y Gen. James Cole, NSA Deputy Dir. John Chris Inglis, FBI Deputy Dir. Sean Joyce, 
General Counsel Office of the Director of National Intelligence Robert Litt); House Judiciary 
Committee Hearing on NSA programs, 113th Cong. (July 17, 2013); Senate Appropriations 
Committee Hearing, 113th Cong. (June 12, 2013) (testimony of Gen. Keith Alexander)(testimony 
of Acting Deputy Homeland Security Secretary Rand Beers; Acting Deputy Commerce Secretary 
Patrick Gallagher, Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology; Richard 
McFeely, Exec. Asst. Dir. Of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation’s Criminal, Cyber, Response and 
Services Branch). 
47 For comprehensive reform bills, see, e.g., USA Freedom Act, S.1599; FISA Improvements Act 
of 2013, S. 1631, 113th Cong. (2013); FISA Accountability and Privacy Protection Act of 2013, 
S.1215, 113th Cong. (2013); LIBERT-E Act, H.R. 2399, 113th Cong. (2013); A bill to modify the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 19789, S.1182, 113th Cong. (2013); Restore Our Privacy 
Act, S. 1168, 113th Cong. (2013); Fourth Amendment Restoration Act of 2013, S.1121, 113th 
Cong. (2013); Relevancy Act, H.R. 2603, 113th Cong. (2013); Surveillance State Repeal Act, H.R. 
2818, 113th Cong. (2013); Telephone Surveillance Accountability Act of 2013, H.R. 2684, 113th 
Cong. (2013); Freedom and Privacy Act of 2013, S. 1701, 113th Cong. (2013).  For bills addressing 
FISC reform see, e.g., FISA Court Judge Selection Reform Act of 2013, S.1460, 113th Cong. 
(2013); FISA Court Reform Act of 2013, S.1467, 113th Cong. (2013); Presidential Appointment of 
FISA Court Judges Act, H.R. 2761, 113th Cong. (2013); FISA Court Accountability Act, H.R. 
2586, 113th Cong. (2013); Privacy Advocate General Act of 2013, 113th Cong. (2013); FISA 
Court in the Sunshine Act of 2013, H.R. 2440, 113th Cong. (2013).  For bills covering other 
aspects of FISA reform see, e.g., Ending Secret Law Act S.1130/H.R. 2475, 113th Cong. (2013); 
NSA Accountability Act, H.R. 3070, 113th Cong. (2013); Government Surveillance Transparency 
Act of 2013, H.R. 2736, 113th Cong. (2013); Surveillance Order Reporting Act of 2013, H.R. 
3035, 113th Cong. (2013); Surveillance Transparency Act of 2013, S.1452, 113th Cong. (2013); 
National Whistleblower Appreciation Day, S. Res. 202, 113th Cong. (2013). 
48 See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on the Report of the President’s Review Group on 
Intelligence and Communications Technologies, 113th Cong. (Jan. 14, 2014); Senate Intelligence 
Committee Hearing on National Security Threats, 113th Cong. (Jan. 29, 2014) (discussing section 
215 and raising concerns about erroneous or misleading statements from government officials 
during previous hearings on NSA surveillance); House Judiciary Committee Hearing on Examining 
Recommendations to Reform FISA Authorities, 113th Cong. (Feb. 4, 2014); Senate Judiciary 
Committee, Hearing on Privacy in the Digital Age:  Preventing Data Breaches and Combating 
Cybercrime, 113th Cong. (Feb. 4, 2014); House intelligence Committee, Hearing on World Wide 
Threats, 113th Cong. (Feb. 4, 2014). 
49 Press Release, DNI Clapper Announces Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies, Aug. 12, 2013, available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-
releases/191-press-releases-2013/909-dni-clapper-announces-review-group-on-intelligence-and-
communications-technologies. Members of the Review Group included Richard A. Clarke, Michael 
J. Morell, Geoffrey R. Stone, Cass R. Sunstein, and Peter Swire. The original press release called it 
the “Director of National Intelligence Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies,” with a directive to report to the President by December 15, 2013; however, the final 
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 recommendations that incorporated a series of significant statutory reforms—
including, inter alia, an end to the current bulk collection of metadata, the 
insertion of a constitutional advocate during FISC deliberations, and new limits 
on and reporting requirements for government applications under and use of 
FISA sections 215, 402, and 702.50 The Review Group recommended that future 
access to metadata be mediated by third parties, with telecommunications 
providers, or other entities, retaining the information, to which access could be 
granted only through specific orders from FISC.51  
In December 2013, in hearings before the Senate, the Deputy Attorney 
General, the Director of the NSA, and the NSA’s General Counsel issued a joint 
statement supporting limited reform of the current system.52  
The following month, the President issued a new Presidential Policy 
Directive (PPD-28), laying out the current principles guiding SIGINT, such as 
the integration of privacy and civil liberties considerations in the collection of 
intelligence, limits on the collection of commercial information and trade secrets, 
and the tailoring of SIGINT to areas where the information is not otherwise 
available. 53  The document restricts the use of bulk SIGINT data. 54  It draws 
attention to the policies and procedures in place with regard to minimization 
(both dissemination and retention of personal data), data security and access, data 
quality, and oversight.55 PDD-28 announced the appointment of a Privacy and 
Civil Liberties official to assist key parties in their development of policies and 
procedures, as well as a coordinator for International Diplomacy to serve as a 
point of contact with foreign governments wishing to raise concerns about U.S. 
intelligence gathering.56  
In his speech accompanying issuance of the directive, the President stated his 
intent to “reform the programs and procedures in place to provide greater 
transparency to our surveillance activities and fortify the safeguards that protect 
report, placed on the White House web site, is entitled “Report and Recommendations of The 
President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies.” REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS 
TECHNOLOGIES, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-
12_rg_final_report.pdf [hereinafter REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP].  
50 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP, supra note 87, at 24-30. 
51 Id. 
52 See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Continued Oversight of U.S. Government 
Surveillance Authorities, 113th Cong. (Dec. 11, 2013) (testimony of Deputy Attorney General 
James M. Cole, Director Keith B. Alexander and General Counsel Robert S. Litt), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/dag/speeches/2013/dag-speech-131211.html (stating, “we would be 
open to discussing legislation authorizing the FISA Court to appoint an amicus, at its discretion, in 
appropriate cases, such as those that present novel and significant questions of law and that involve 
the acquisition and retention of information concerning a substantial number of U.S. persons.”). 
53 Presidential Policy Directive 28, §1 (Jan. 27, 2014) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities. 
54 Id., at § 2 (directing that the data be used “only for the purposes of detecting and countering: (1) 
espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign powers or their intelligence services 
against the United States and its interests; (2) threats to the United States and its interests from 
terrorism; (3) threats to the United States and its interests from the development, possession, 
proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; (4) cybersecurity threats; (5) threats to U.S. or 
allied Armed Forces or other U.S or allied personnel; and (6) transnational criminal threats, 
including illicit finance and sanctions evasion related to the other purposes named in this section.”). 
55 Id. at § 4. 
56 Id. 
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 the privacy of U.S. persons.” 57  For the bulk collection program, this meant 
ordering a transition to end it, as it currently exists, and establishing an 
alternative collection structure—potentially along the lines of that recommended 
by the Review Group. To facilitate a transfer to a new system, the President 
instructed the intelligence community to develop options for a new approach, 
with a report due back to the President prior to FISC’s reauthorization 
consideration March 28, 2014.58   
The President’s remarks and issuance of PPD 28 minimized but did not 
eliminate the impact of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
(PCLOB) Section 215 report, which was slotted for publication the following 
week.59 That report made clear that the PCLOB considered the bulk collection of 
metadata to be illegal as both a statutory and a constitutional matter. The 238-
page document called for an end to current program. Two of the board’s five 
members (Rachel L. Brand and Elisebeth Collins Cook, both of whom served in 
the Department of Justice during the George W. Bush Administration) supported 
modifications to the program to take account of privacy concerns. The three 
remaining members (David Medine, who was a Federal Trade Commission 
official during the Clinton Administration; James X. Dempsey, a public policy 
specialist at the Center for Democracy and Technology; and Patricia M. Wald, a 
former federal appeals court judge nominated by President Jimmy Carter), 
considered it necessary to end the program altogether.60 
Four days before the deadline, President Obama announced that, 
notwithstanding a further, 90-day extension of the program, he planned to ask 
Congress to end bulk collection altogether.61  In its place, telephone companies 
will retain the records for the usual amount of time, with the NSA only having 
access to particular records with FISC approval.62 
The President’s proposal goes some way towards meeting widespread 
criticism of the Section 215 program.  It does not, however, address either all of 
the critiques, nor does it affect the programs that continue under Section 702.63  
57 Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence (Jan. 17, 2014), in WASH. POST, Jan. 
17, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-obamas-jan-17-speech-on-
nsa-reforms/2014/01/17/fa33590a-7f8c-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html. 
58 Id. 
59 PCLOB is an independent, bipartisan entity established by statute whose members are appointed 
by the President.  See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. 
L. No. 110-53, § 801(a), 121 Stat. 266, 352-58 (2007). 
60 PCLOB Report, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 168-170, 208-218. 
61 Charlie Savage, Obama to Call for End to NSA’s Bulk Data Collection, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 
2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/us/obama-to-seek-nsa-curb-on-call-
data.html?_r=0.   
62 Id. 
63 See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Reform, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION 
CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/reform/ (last visited Feb. 19. 2014); Jennifer 
Grannick, Reforming FISA:  A Critical Look at the Wyden/Udall Proposal and Foreign 
Surveillance, CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/publications/reforming-fisa-critical-look-wydenudall-proposal-and-
foreign-surveillance; Orin Kerr, A Proposal to Reform FISA Court Decisionmaking, , THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (July 8, 2013), http://www.volokh.com/2013/07/08/a-proposal-to-reform-fisa-court-
decisionmaking/; Marty Lederman, Data-Mining, Section 215, and Regulating the Government’s 
Use of Stored Data:  the Overlooked, but More Important, Question about NSA Surveillance, JUST 
SECURITY (Dec. 23, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/2013/12/23/review-group-intelligence-
communications-technologies-bulk-data-collection-section-215/.  See generally Category Archives:  
FISA:  Reform, LAWFARE BLOG, http://www.lawfareblog.com/category/fisa/fisa-
reform/#.UsGp0I5xKPc (highlighting posts by Lauren Bateman, Benjamin Wittes, Raffaela 
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 Part of the problem is that the conversation has proceeded in a piecemeal fashion.  
The president’s proposal will thus become yet another bill for Congress to 
consider.  What has been missing from the discourse is a comprehensive 
framework for how to think about potential reforms.64  
If ever there were a time to re-think how to approach foreign intelligence 
gathering in a blue-skies fashion, that time is now. Technology has radically 
altered the landscape from both a threat perspective and from the vantage of 
privacy and civil liberties. A fragmented approach risks ignoring the potential 
effects of alterations in the law and opportunities to create a sustainable structure. 
In constructing such an approach, the first step is to consider how new and 
emerging technologies have altered the environment in which we now operate. 
This fundamentally shifts the conversation from an historically-laden approach to 
one that begins from a different point of analysis:  namely, the technologies that 
now dominate the electronic communications sphere. 
III. THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON THE INFORMATION RANGE AVAILABLE 
 
The evolution of technology has had a profound impact on how information is 
generated, transferred, and stored. New types of information are now available. 
Novel analytical tools allow for the generation of deeper insight into traditional 
and emerging forms of information. Technology has also affected the geographic 
assumptions underlying traditional foreign intelligence gathering (i.e., that a 
sharp line can be drawn between domestic and international information flows, 
with heightened protections afforded the former).  
Overlaying the traditional design has been the creation of additional 
protections afforded to U.S. persons. The problem is that this approach assumes 
that the identity of the individual (a) is known; and (b) can be closely aligned 
with the targeted information. New technologies, however, allow for identity 
masking and anonymity, as well as for the existence of significant amounts of 
information dissociated at the front end from individual targets.  
In considering potential changes to FISA, it is necessary to first consider how 
one should think about new and emerging forms of information, and the method 
by which such information is generated, transmitted, and stored.  
A. Types of Information 
 
Consider first different types of information. At the most general level, over 
the past four decades, the law has recognized three principal areas: content, 
personally-identifiable information (PII), and business records (including, inter 
Wakeman, Matt Danzer, Wells Bennett, Peter Margulies, Jack Goldsmith, Tim Edgar, Joel 
Brenner, Sean Mirski, and others on the topic). 
64 But see David Kris, Thoughts on a Blue-Sky Overhaul of Surveillance Laws:  Introduction, 
LAWFARE BLOG (May 18, 2013) http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/05/thoughts-on-a-blue-sky-
overhaul-of-surveillance-laws-introduction/#.UsG0H45xKPc; David Kris, Thoughts on a Blue-Sky 
Overhaul of Surveillance Laws: Challenges, LAWFARE BLOG (May 19, 2013) 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/05/thoughts-on-a-blue-sky-overhaul-of-surveillance-laws-
challenges/#.UsG0Y45xKPc; David Kris, Thoughts on a Blue-Sky Overhaul of Surveillance Laws:  
Approach, LAWFARE BLOG (May 20, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/05/thoughts-on-a-
blue-sky-overhaul-of-surveillance-laws-approach/#.UsGzi45xKPc (3-part blog written prior to the 
Snowden releases, looking at FISA reform, considering potential challenges to alterations to the 
current regime, and contemplating possible future approaches). 
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 alia, banking and financial records). These categories have been provided with 
different levels of protection.  
The Supreme Court, for example, has traditionally applied a higher level of 
protection to content and, in the context of third party doctrine, a lower level of 
protection to customer records held by companies. Accordingly, traditional FISA 
created a more stringent regime for electronic communications or physical 
searches, wherein content would be obtained, and a lower level of protection for 
the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices.  
As new technologies have presented, particularly in a post-9/11 environment, 
there have been efforts to apply the rules accompanying these categories to new 
areas. Developed in a different context, though, such statutory requirements may 
be ill suited to the task. As a result, institutional design may fail, courts may be 
unable to monitor implementation, Congressional oversight may be lacking, and 
civil liberties and privacy protections carefully considered in a different context 
may be bypassed. Continued reliance on these categories also risks masking the 
impact of emerging technologies on the evolution of each category, as well as 
preventing recognition of the expansion in the different types of information 
available. 
In light of the current state of technology, it is thus worth considering at least 
five categories of information that have emerged: personal, transactional, 
relational, geolocational, and content-based. (See Figure 1) A brief discussion 
helps to illustrate the distinction between these areas. 
The first category, personal information, relates to a single individual whose 
identity can be obtained from the information itself, or from that information and 
other information that is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the 
possession of, the person controlling the information. Traditionally this category 
has included information such as one’s social security number, home address, 
credit card number, health or medical records, insurance information, and 
educational records. New technologies, however, have extended this category to 
include areas like biometric identification markers (e.g., facial recognition, DNA, 
and iris patterns), habit identification, and pattern matching. 
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Figure 1 
 
The second category, transactional information, incorporates commercial 
transactions—i.e., the process of buying or selling something. It suggests a 
contractual relationship between two or more entities in which goods, services, or 
money are passed from one entity to another. Historically, this category was 
limited to banking or financial records or the purchase of property—and, again, 
differing levels of protection were provided, particularly as it was extended to 
areas like billing records. But transactional information also includes contractual 
agreements between entities and records pertaining thereto. 
The third category, relational information, has emerged as an independent 
area as technology related to social network analysis has evolved. Using both 
visual and mathematical tools, new technologies allow individuals to map and to 
analyze various types of flows between people, groups, organizations, geographic 
regions, computers, URLs, and other connected entities. Relational information 
gives insight into not just the existence of connections between individuals, but 
their various roles and groupings within a network—i.e., who are the key 
connectors, leaders, bridges, and isolates, where the key clusters are and who 
comprises them, who is in the core of the network, and who is on the periphery. 
Social network analysis yields additional insight into the distribution of resources 
(both material and nonmaterial), and potential constraints on individual actions.65 
The fourth category, locational information, identifies the specific physical 
location of an object or an individual. It thus relates to the geography of the real 
world. Geolocational data in particular has come to be associated with 
technologically-enhanced methods of ascertaining physical placement (e.g., 
radar, GPS devices in automobiles or mobile phones, or internet connections). 
This category also incorporates the more traditional mode of ascertaining 
65 For further discussion see S. WASSERMAN AND K. FAUST, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS (1994). 
Laura K. Donohue FISA Reform 15 
                                                        
 individuals’ locations—i.e., the simple observation of individuals in public 
space.66 
The fifth category, content, is perhaps the most traditional category in its 
close association with both the First and Fourth Amendments. Technology, 
however, has expanded the range of materials that may provide what can be 
considered substantive information. At the broadest level, content includes the 
substance of communications, writings, and other materials. As a form of 
communication, it conveys information through the exchange of ideas, thoughts, 
or other information, such as through speech, writing, or symbolic 
representations. It incorporates media content as well, such as pictures, videos, 
auditory files, and writing. It thus relates to the nature of individual experience. 
Each of these categories has privacy interests associated with it that are 
particular to that type of information. This suggests that consideration of each 
category, sui generis, may be necessary to construct the most appropriate 
structures to protect such privacy interests. An added layer of complexity here is 
that the manner in which such information presents in each category—i.e., the 
way it is accessed, transmitted, or stored—differs. 
B. Method of Access, Transmission, and Storage 
 
Each of the different forms of information (personal, transactional, relational, 
locational, and content) may be accessed, transmitted, and stored in different 
ways. Some of these may be non-digital, such as simply observing another’s 
actions or reading a hand-written letter. Others, such as accessing information 
held on a server, may be technology-dependent. Simply extending the existing 
rules from hard copy to hard drives, though, misses the enhanced privacy 
implications of greater amounts of information and advanced back-end 
analysis. 67 Six categories here deserve notice: audio/visual (AV) observation; 
communications networks; papers; hard drives (HD) and device-specific storage; 
remote server/cloud technologies; and social media. (See Figure 1) 
The first category, A/V observation, is one of the most traditional ways in 
which information is accessed. Under this approach, information is obtained by 
observing a particular target or entity’s actions. Traditional modes of information 
collection in this area still exist—this is the realm of placing a tail on a suspect in 
the law enforcement world, or of HUMINT in the intelligence community. The 
key point here is that technology has expanded the ways in which one may be 
able to observe such actions. Electronic bugs represented one of the early 
66 Efforts to address the collection of this information have been introduced into Congress, but no 
laws have yet been passed.  See, e.g., Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, S. 639, 113th 
Cong. (2013),  see also H.R. 1312, 113th Cong. (2013); Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance Act, 
S. 1212, 112th Cong. (2011), see also Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance Act, H.R. 2168, 112th 
Cong. (2011) (sponsored by Sen. Ron Wyden and Rep. Jason Chaffetz in the House and Senate 
respectively).  Online Communications and Geolocation Protection Act, H.R. 983, 113th Cong. ( 
2013) (introduced by Reps Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), Ted Poe (R-TX), and Suzan DelBene (D-WA)).  
Location Privacy Protection Act of 2012, S. 1223, 113th Cong. (2012) (introduced by Sen. Al 
Franken (D-MN), passed the Senate Judiciary Committee in Dec. 2012). 
67 For purposes of this paper, I understand data in a manner consistent with the Data Protection Act, 
that is, information which:  “(a) is being processed by means of equipment operating automatically 
in response to instructions given for that purpose, (b) is recorded with the intention that it should be 
processed by means of such equipment, (c) is recorded as part of a relevant filing system or with 
the intention that it should form part of a relevant filing system, (d) does not fall within paragraph 
(a), (b) or (c) but forms part of an accessible record as defined by section 68, or (e) is recorded 
information held by a public authority and does not fall within any of paragraphs (a) to (d).” 
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 expansions. Placed in an individual’s office or home, such devices allow 
investigators or analysts to hear conversations that are occurring within, thus 
giving them access to the content of communications. Katz dealt with such an 
“amplifying device,” attached to the outside of a phone booth. The Court 
recognized at the time that new technologies applied to traditional areas could 
have a deeper impact on the right to privacy.  
Other types of technologies are similarly relevant to enhanced A/V 
observation, and they cross informational categories. CCTV, for instance, may 
allow for remote surveillance even where the information obtained is not 
recorded. This extends beyond content information to include locational data: 
individuals may be followed in public space via traffic cameras, surveillance 
equipment on drones, satellite cameras, or other technologies. Such tracking may 
similarly reveal meetings, actions in the workplace, and social interactions—all 
forms of relational information. Observations of commercial exchanges, such as 
individuals shopping or withdrawing money from the ATM, represent 
transactional information. And in the realm of personal information, A/V 
observation may track individuals by appearance (e.g., using facial recognition), 
or by license plate [e.g., via automatic license-plate recognition (ALPR) or car 
plate recognition (CPR) systems]. Such tracking through public space may 
identify individuals’ habits, their home address, their movements, and common 
patterns in which they engage.68 
The second category, communications networks, incorporates wire, cable, 
and satellite communication systems. This is the realm of electronic 
surveillance—which was one of the central areas addressed by FISA in 1978. 
The purpose was to provide a heightened level of protection for the content of 
individuals’ communications. But technology has progressed significantly 
beyond the telephone and wire communications originally considered. 
Communications networks may be accessed via telephones, computers, or other 
devices that link up to the Internet. Content information may be conveyed 
through telephone conversations, Face Time, texts, emails, or voice over Internet 
protocol (VOIP).  
Much more than content is now involved in information carried through 
communications networks. Locational data, such as GPS transmissions, may be 
transferred. Relational data based on telephone and internet content may yield 
insight into social networks. Transactional information also may be conducted 
via automated telephone systems: post-cut-through dialed digits (PCTDD) 
(numbers dialed on a phone once a call has been put through) allow customers to 
buy airline tickets, transfer money between accounts, and sell stock. In the 
criminal law realm, efforts have been made to apply PRTT to this area. The 
problem is that PCTDD also reveals content—suggesting a deeper privacy 
interest than mere envelope information.69 To the extent that automated systems 
reveal personal data, such as social security numbers (SSN), credit card or bank 
account numbers, address information, and passwords (such as mother’s maiden 
name, place of birth, name of first pet), personal information is similarly 
implicated. 
68 See Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap and Constitutional Abyss: Remote 
Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINNESOTA L. REV. 407, 443 (2012). 
69 In the Matter of Applications of the United States of America for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use 
of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber 
Information, 515 F.Supp. 2d 325, 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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 Notably, neither of the first two categories (A/V observation and 
communications networks) record what has historically been considered content. 
Instead, they record process and movement. Individual A goes to Place 1, then 
Place 2, and then Place 3. Or number X dials number Y. Or person A uses Credit 
Card Z. The recording of process and movement is what generates information.  
Critics of the bulk collection programs point to the generation of information 
premised on structural connections, and the ability of the government to amass 
this information in large quantities, at reduced cost, and over extensive periods, 
to note the significant privacy implication. It may also be prospective, which 
shifts the question from how to access stored information or already-existing 
data, to how to control access to information generated in this manner in the 
future.  
The third category, papers, is the one most closely associated with Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence—not least because of the wording of the provision 
itself. 70  Content information located in papers has thus traditionally been 
afforded the highest level of protection. Since obtaining one’s letters, books, and 
writings, has generally required entry into one’s domicile, a warrant, or 
something approaching a warrant in the realm of foreign intelligence, has 
typically been required.  
FISA, accordingly, includes within its auspices special provisions for 
physical search that, along with electronic communications (also content-based), 
are afforded the highest level of protection.  
Lines between categories may, of course, be somewhat permeable. The 
substance of one’s papers may demonstrate an individual’s location at a 
particular time, such as via receipts. Relational information may be ascertained 
from correspondence, and transactional information from financial records. 
Simultaneously, papers may provide personal information, such as one’s 
health/medical, or educational records.  
Notably, scientific advances have deepened the type of information that may 
be found in one’s personal papers. DNA technologies, for instance, may reveal a 
host of information about individuals that was not previously knowable. But 
minimization procedures have failed to account for the qualitative differences in 
types of personal information obtained. Instead, they are rather crudely based on 
whether an individual is a U.S. person or a non-U.S. person. 
The digitization of this information has not lessened the privacy interests 
involved. If anything, its presentation in an analyzable format has deepened the 
privacy implications. Simultaneously, the increased volume of information 
means that much more about an individual and his or her movements can be 
ascertained. Whereas before an individual’s prior location might be determined 
by a receipt, mobile devices now include maps that can be queried for directions 
and that archive all of the places on has travelled. Pictures taken on an iPhone 
may include embedded data with the precise location at which the image was 
snapped. To the extent that mobile devices reflect their owner’s actions (and not 
those of others who use or borrow the device), they create a digital map of an 
individual’s movements. Yet the statute—and, indeed, the Court’s 
jurisprudence—has failed to acknowledge this equal, or deeper, privacy 
intrusion.  
70 To wit, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures…” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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 As a result, in the fourth category, hard drives and electronic devices, we find 
varied application of the existing rules. This category encompasses information 
held in electronic format on individual electronic devices, as well as other forms 
of local storage, such as memory sticks and stand-alone external hard drives. 
Content may thus take a number of forms—e.g., documents, spreadsheets, 
audio/visual files, and new code.71  
Recent court documents suggest that there is confusion about what level of 
protection to give to electronic devices in the face of steadily expanding 
government capabilities. Confronted by requests by the FBI to place malware on 
a suspect’s computer and to access a wide range of information held by the 
device in the course of an investigation, for instance, district court judges have 
come out on different sides of the issue. 72  Network investigative techniques 
(NIT) allow the FBI to covertly download files, photographs, and stored emails, 
or even to activate cameras located on computers, allowing the government to 
obtain real-time images.73 The privacy interests involved in NIT are substantial. 
As the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc recognized in U.S. v. Cotterman in the 
context of a border search of a laptop: 
The amount of private information carried by international travelers was traditionally 
circumscribed by the size of the traveler’s luggage or automobile. That is no longer the 
case. Electronic devices are capable of storing warehouses full of information. The 
average 400-gigabyte laptop hard drive can store over 200 million pages—the equivalent 
of five floors of a typical academic library. . . . Even a car full of packed suitcases with 
sensitive documents cannot hold a candle to the sheer, and ever-increasing, capacity of 
digital storage.74 
Pari passu, the amount of information that can be obtained from any individual’s 
laptop is staggering. Recent media reports suggest that the NSA has inserted 
malware into computer networks, as well as, like the FBI, into individual 
computers, to collect information. 75  Simultaneously, the agency has 
compromised encryption technologies by arranging for secret “back doors” to be 
built into software, by making secret agreements with private companies, and by 
using supercomputers to overcome barriers using brute force.76  
71 Early reports about law enforcement use of malware emerged in 2001 with discussion of Magic 
Lantern, MSNBC.  The programs have since become increasingly sophisticated. 
72 Compare Third Amended Search and Seizure Warrant, No. 12-SW-05685 (D. Colo. Dec. 11, 
2012); with Memorandum and Order, In Re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises 
Unknown, No. 4:13-MJ-00234 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2013). 
73 Craig Timberg and Ellen Nakashima, FBI’s search for ‘Mo,’ suspect in bomb threats, highlights 
use of malware for surveillance, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/fbis-search-for-mo-suspect-in-bomb-threats-
highlights-use-of-malware-for-surveillance/2013/12/06/352ba174-5397-11e3-9e2c-
e1d01116fd98_story.html. 
74 Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 964. 
75 See, e.g., Violet Blue, NSA malware infected over 50,000 computer networks worldwide, ZD NET 
(Nov. 23, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-malware-infected-over-50000-computer-networks-
worldwide-7000023537/; Andrea Peterson, The NSA has its own team of elite hackers, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/29/the-nsa-
has-its-own-team-of-elite-hackers/; Floor Boon, Steven Derix, and Huib Modderkolk, NSA infected 
50,000 computer networks with malicious software, NRC.NL (Nov. 23, 2013) 
http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-
software/; Raphael Satter, Report:  NSA intercepts computer deliveries, USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 
2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/12/29/report-nsa-intercepts-computer-
deliveries/4244181/. 
76 James Ball, Julian Borger, and Glenn Greenwald, Revealed:  how US and UK spy agencies 
defeat internet privacy and security, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 5, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security; Jeff Larson, 
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 The location of the devices in question, which is one of the traditional ways 
to think about procuring foreign intelligence, seems to be a minor matter, when 
compared to the privacy implications of access to such broad swathes of data. 
The fifth category, centered on server and cloud technologies, recognizes that 
the same type of information that may be held on individual devices may be 
stored on a remote server, such as IBM Cloud, iCloud, Kindle Cloud, or Amazon 
Cloud. Some companies, such as Dropbox, ZipCloud, SugarSync, and Google 
Gdrive, offer the ability to store all data remotely, so that the information can be 
shared and accessed at any time. Other companies, such as Livedrive, Mozy, and 
BackupGenie, operate primarily as an online backup to individual devices. Yet 
others, such as MyPCBackup and JustCloud offer both services.  
The cloud, though, does more than just offer ways to store information. 
Cloud computing uses a network of remote servers hosted on the Internet to 
manage and process data, extending these functions beyond individual hard 
drives or personal devices. Because of the sophistication of analytical techniques, 
the amount of storage available, and the potential multi-sourcing of data 
involved, cloud computing changes what individuals and companies can actually 
do. It provides an opportunity for users to increase their capacity and to add 
capabilities without extensive, new investments in infrastructure, software, and 
personnel. And the market is exploding. As of July 2013, for instance, 
approximately 30 public companies represented more than $100 billion in market 
capitalization and $12.5 billion in estimated 2013 revenue.77 
The same techniques that may be used to exploit hard drives and individual, 
stand-alone electronic devices may be employed to obtain content, as well as 
locational, relational, transactional, and personal information, from remote 
servers. The amount of information available—and insight into—the thoughts 
and actions of the target may be significantly enhanced—not least because more 
information can be uploaded and more powerful analytical software may be 
marshaled in relation to the cloud. In addition, there are some functions, such as 
online gaming, that are unique to the world of servers in that they take place (in 
part) on servers located outside the immediate electronic device. Efforts to 
communicate with others inside the gaming world may be subject to interception 
with (under traditional foreign intelligence provisions) little or no structure, 
oversight, or control. Yet this, too, is a form of access to the content of one’s 
communications—an area traditionally afforded the highest, not the lowest, level 
of protection to ensure that foreign intelligence gathering comports with the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The sixth category, social media, is a form of electronic communication 
where users can create virtual communities to share information, ideas, personal 
messages, photographs, videos, and other data. Web sites like Facebook, Twitter, 
Google+, Instagram, and Snapchat have become a critical form of networking 
and microblogging. They cross different types of information categories, 
simultaneously generating content, locational information, and relational 
information. The companies hosting the sites, in turn, maintain billing records, 
Pro Publica, Nicole Perlroth, and Scott Shane, Revealed:  The NSA’s Secret Campaign to Crack, 
Undermine Internet Security, PRO PUBLICA, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.propublica.org/article/the-
nsas-secret-campaign-to-crack-undermine-internet-encryption. 
77 The top 15 cloud computing companies include Jife Software, Demandware, Fleetmatics, 
RealPage, Dealertrack Technologies, Cornerstone OnDemand, Medidata Solutions, The Ultimate 
Software Group, Athenahealth, Concur Technologies, ServiceNow, NetSuite, Workday, LinkedIn, 
and Salesforce.com. 
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 metadata, and other forms of transactional information, even as they have access 
to a host of personally-identifiable information about their account holders. 
Each of these six categories, as it intersects with the five types of information 
that now exist, present opportunities for agencies looking to learn information 
about potential targets. Yet not all information is equal: the substance and 
techniques employed may yield different levels of value as well as different 
levels of insight into individuals’ private actions, thoughts, and beliefs.  
From a value perspective, at one extreme, programs that fail to provide 
meaningful intelligence in the manner anticipated, may be voluntarily ended by 
the IC. According to James Clapper, for instance, “[i]n December 2011, the 
Government decided not to seek reauthorization of the bulk collection of Internet 
metadata.” 78  ODNI explained, “the program was no longer meeting the 
operational expectations that NSA had for it.”79  
Reliance, however, on the value of a program to the intelligence agency 
involved for whether it will or will not operate would be misplaced. Individuals 
who have insight into the program’s extent may disagree about its worth. The 
bulk collection of telephony metadata, has been challenged by individuals on the 
Senate Intelligence Committee, who have substantial access to the inner 
workings of the program, on the grounds that it does not yield significant 
benefits. 80 But not all members of the committee—much less officials in the 
agencies themselves—agree with that position.81  
Regardless of how useful a program may be, underlying social, political, and 
constitutional concerns remain. To the extent that the different categories of 
information and related access, transmission, and storage yield differing levels of 
confidential information, different privacy interests come into play. Traditional 
models, based on, for instance, geography (i.e., whether the object, device, or 
target is located within US bounds or outside the country), rather miss the point. 
It is thus crucial to build an expanded understanding of the types of information 
in question into the statutory framework. These categories fold into the proposed 
taxonomy, below.  
IV. TAXONOMY FOR REFORM 
 
An unsystematic approach to reforming FISA risks masking the ways in which 
technology has altered the underlying landscape—particularly assumptions built 
78 Press Release, DNI Announces the Declassification of the Existence of Collection Activities 
Authorized by President George W. Bush Shortly after the Attacks of September 11, 2011, Dec. 21, 
2013, available at http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/70683717031/dni-announces-the-
declassification-of-the. 
79 Additional Information on the Discontinued PR/TT Program, IC ON THE RECORD, OFFICE OF THE 
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 21, 2013), 
http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/tagged/declassified. 
80 Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), Senator Mark Udall (D-Co), for instance, both of whom sit on the 
U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, filed an amicus brief in November 2013 in First Unitarian 
Church v. NSA, asserting that they had “reviewed this surveillance extensively and have seen no 
evidence that the bulk collection of Americans’ phone records has provided any intelligence of 
value that could not have been gathered through less intrusive means.” Motion Of Senator Ron 
Wyden, Senator Mark Udall & Senator Martin Heinrich to file a brief Amicus Curiae at 2, First 
Unitarian Church v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 13-3287 (N.D. Cal. 2013), available at 
https://www.eff.org/document/amici-brief-senators-wyden-udall-heinrich.  
81 See, e.g., Dianne Feinstein, The NSA’s Watchfulness Protects America, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 
2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304520704579125950862794052. 
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 into the statute in 1978. It also imperils the recognition of opportunities to 
respond more effectively to a shifting threat environment, as well as ways in 
which these new technologies carry with them unique incursions into civil 
liberties and the Fourth Amendment right to privacy. Minor shifts in statutory 
construction risk creating imbalance in institutional design. A system, for 
instance, that is built on placing electronic intercepts on traditional telephone 
lines may miss the importance of assigning a science and technology expert to 
FISC in order to help the court to understand new and emerging technologies. 
Similarly, geographic emphasis may fail to take account of global information 
flows.  
A systematic re-evaluation of foreign intelligence gathering has not occurred 
since 1978. Statutory changes implemented in 1995, 1998, 2001, 2006, 2008, and 
2011 failed to take a universal approach, instead altering the statute in limited or 
tangential ways. 82 The most significant changes expanded current sections or 
added new provisions to the statute—such as the addition of business records in 
1998 and their expansion in 2001 to tangible goods, or the inclusion of Sections 
702, 703 and 704 in 2008.83 These amendments did not contemplate ways in 
which technology is changing how we should think about foreign intelligence 
gathering writ large. They did not consider the broader statutory design. And, for 
the most part, they did not explicitly deal with new and emerging technologies.  
For these reasons, a comprehensive taxonomy is helpful now for thinking 
through changes that could be put into place. Where might we start if, in light of 
current technologies, we were to begin constructing a framework for foreign 
intelligence from the ground up? This question puts some of the assumptions that 
undergird FISA back on the table for discussion even as it introduces potentially 
new approaches. 
Structurally, the proposed taxonomy can be thought of in two parts: a front-
end and a back-end. The former framework deals with the authority to collect 
information and the latter the implementation of the authorities—i.e., the manner 
in which such information is obtained, analyzed and used. Both frameworks sub-
divide into two sections that exist in equilibrium: the first deals with the positive 
grant of authority, and the second with a check on the exercise of such powers. 
The latter thus balances the former, providing a counterpoise to potential 
authorities.  
Although the typology is designed to be cognizant of the need to create 
avenues for the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence information, as 
well as the need for protections on the exercise of these authorities, it does not in 
and of itself take a position on where these lines should be drawn. Instead, the 
purpose is to highlight the types of provisions that could be taken on board in 
building a comprehensive framework. 
A. Front-End Framework to Collect Foreign Intelligence Information 
 
Front-end considerations relate to the acquisition of information. They divide 
into (1) the manner of collection, and (2) requirements for approval of the 
82 Intelligence Authorization Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, 108 Stat. 3423 (1994), Intelligence 
Authorization Act of 1999, Pub. L.  No. 105-272, 112 Stat. 2396 (1998); USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. 
L. 107-56, Oct. 26, 2001; USA PATRIOT Additional Authorization Amendments Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. 109-178, 115 Stat. 272 (2006); FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-261, 122 Stat. 
2436 (2008); FISA Sunsets Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 112-3, 125 Stat. 5 (2011). 
83 Id. 
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 authorities thereby created. (See Figure 2) The structure thus reflects a positive 
grant of authority under certain conditions (1), and structures to ensure that the 
appropriate processes are followed prior to government entities acting on those 
powers (2). While (2) thus acts primarily as a limitation on (1), it would be too 
simplistic to say that each category only performs these functions. For there are a 
number of ways in the sub-divisions in (1) could be constructed to provide 
checks on the system. Nevertheless, approaching the question in this manner 
allows for attention to be drawn to the different functions of the relevant entities. 
 
FRONT-END FRAMEWORK TO COLLECT FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 
 
Manner of Collection Requirements for Approval 
1. Type of information 
a. Content 
b. Locational 
c. Relational 
d. Transactional 
e. Personal 
2. Method of access/transmission/storage 
a. A/V (immediate observation) 
b. Communications Technologies 
c. Paper/tangible goods 
d. HD/Device 
e. Server/Cloud Technologies 
f. Social media  
3. Form in which information is transferred 
   a. Anonymization and re-identification 
   b. Prior screening by third party 
4. Agency obtaining information 
a. Broad institutional design (e.g., 
NSA/CYBERCOM division) 
b. Primary authorization (e.g., FBI, CIA, NSA) 
c. Concurrences req’d (e.g., AG, NSD) 
5. Target 
a. US v. non-US persons 
b. Foreign powers/agents thereof 
c. Terrorists (KSTs/Int’l) 
6. Source of information 
a. Private industry 
- data retention requirements and costs 
- voluntary v. compulsory compliance 
- data security 
- litigation risks 
b. Third party data holders 
- relationship to gov’t, private entities  
- division of information between entities 
   - data security.  
   - encryption keyholders (internal/external) 
c. Government agencies 
d. Non-governmental entities 
e. International partners 
- verification of information 
7. Location of information 
a. International v. domestic 
b. Mixed (e.g., cyber) 
c. Border 
 
1. Entity Approving Collection 
a. Executive 
- agency-internal 
- agency-external 
b. Judicial 
- special court (e.g., FISC) 
- ordinary Art. III court 
- Art. I court 
c. Other (e.g., private industry) 
2. Construction of entity 
a. Selection of decision-makers 
- originating entity (e.g., Circuit 
division, regional division, etc.) 
- manner of selection (e.g., President, 
Chief Justice, SCOTUS, Congress) 
b. Length/progression of terms (period of 
years, staggered terms, term limits) 
c. Adversarial processes 
- Rights of challenge 
- Rights of appeal 
- Third party rights 
- Constitutional advocate 
d. Technological expertise 
3. Scope of approval 
a. Application format 
b. Standards (e.g., particularized, RAS) 
c. Duration 
d. Renewal requirements 
4. Verification 
   a. Third party data holder requirements 
   b. Encryption keyholder requirements 
5. Emergency exceptions 
  a. Substantive requirements 
  b. Timeline for subsequent approval 
  c. Use of information 
Figure 2 
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 1. Manner of Collection 
 
The first two considerations in the manner of collection center on the type of 
information in question and the method of access thereto, as well as the way in 
which such information is transmitted and stored. Part III of this article has 
already considered these areas in some depth. A short discussion will help to 
illustrate how using these demarcations would significantly depart from the 
current orientation of FISA, which relies on the target and the location of the 
information, and help to construct a new approach to foreign intelligence. 
Consider first the type of information. It may be that personal and/or 
transactional information (e.g., the association of particular credit card numbers 
or billing records in relation to specific individuals) should be considered in a 
category apart from relational information, which in turn could be distinguished 
from locational or content-based information.  
In other words, the associated structures may depend upon the type of 
information being sought. The number and types of entities from whom personal 
and/or transactional information may be obtained, the process for obtaining the 
information, what information may be retained, the manner and length of time of 
retention, and the use of such provisions would then revolve around the 
information itself, thus allowing the provisions to be tailored to the specific 
privacy interest involved. 
This approach allows for more careful consideration of the type of 
information in question. For relational information, for instance, in addition to 
the threshold issue, perhaps the most important question is how to treat different 
levels of social connectedness—e.g., it may be a lesser privacy intrusion to 
obtain information that an individual is a member of an organization, than to look 
at relationships within organizations to consider the role one plays within the 
entity. Similarly, it may be that there are greater (or fewer) privacy interests in 
building social networks of geographic regions versus looking at individuals with 
similar political, economic, or religious subject-matter-interests. The mere 
observation of individuals’ involvement, moreover, may be less intrusive than the 
digitization of such information and the combination of such data with other 
information—suggesting heightened privacy protections as one moves outward 
along the digitization axis (see Figure 1). 
To the extent that locational information reveals substantive data, perhaps it 
should be placed within a framework similar to content-based approaches. Again, 
the outward movement along the digitization axis may trigger further protections 
as the data changes form or is incorporated into recombinant systems (i.e., 
systems that combine data with other information that allows the user a greater 
level of insight into individuals’ private lives).  
Beyond the first two categories (the type of information, and the method of 
access, transmission, or storage), the manner of collection may be constructed 
with reference to five further areas. First, the form in which information is 
transferred may be considered as part of the front-end collection. The data, for 
instance, may be anonymized before it is provided to the government agency, 
with only certain data points meeting a pre-set selection criteria then subjected to 
re-identification. 84 Alternatively, a third party data-holder may pre-screen the 
results of any searches. Thus, for instance, if a search returns 400 numbers, those 
84 But see Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy:  Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010). 
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 relating to non-concerning entities could be screened out prior to government 
examination of the data. 
Second, contours may be built around access to information based on the 
agency obtaining the information. This, in turn, has three components: (a) broad 
institutional design [e.g., deciding to separate NSA/CYBERCOM or requiring 
civilian personnel to head particular agencies), (b) primary authorization [e.g., 
authorizing the FBI but preventing the CIA (as in Exec. Order 12333) from 
engaging in certain activities], and (c) concurrences required (e.g., requiring the 
Attorney General or the Assistant Attorney General of the National Security 
Division to sign off on applications to obtain information). 
The third consideration is the target about whom information is sought. 
Traditionally, FISA has focused on U.S. versus non-U.S. persons, presenting 
higher barriers to collection of information on the former, versus the latter. It has 
overlaid this with two additional categories—namely, whether individuals are 
foreign powers or agents thereof, or involved in international terrorism. These 
categories are decidedly individual, requiring a nexus between the target of the 
information and the category. Discussion thus may turn on the level of suspicion 
required to collect information related to a target, for instance requiring a 
statement of facts supporting reasonable, articulable suspicion. (Note that one 
would then expect parity between this and the scope of approval, addressed, 
below). 
A fourth, associated area may be the source of the information itself. FISA 
has only tangentially considered this in relation to business records and, 
subsequently, tangible goods. But there are numerous sources that could be 
considered. Private industry may generate and/or store information. Different 
approaches that could be taken here include possibly introducing data retention 
requirements, which gives rise to considerations of cost. Data security prior to 
government access could be statutorily addressed. Attention also could be drawn 
to voluntary versus compulsory compliance and associated risks of litigation 
borne by the companies. Alternatively, reform efforts may want to focus on 
constructing new, third-party data holders, which may be linked in some way 
either to government or to industry—or to neither. Under this approach, further 
thought may be given to dividing information between entities for additional 
protection of data. In this case, the security of the data would also be relevant, as 
would the potential for introducing yet another third party in the form of 
encryption key holders—the purpose of which is to divide the process via which 
the information is accessed.85 Encryption key holders may also be built into the 
independent entity holding the data, much like an IG office is part of the 
institutional framework of a government entity. 
Information may also be obtained from other government agencies, in which 
case interim MOUs, standards, and procedures will have to be taken into 
consideration. Or it may be derived from non-governmental entities. If obtained 
from international partners, further verification of the information may be 
required. If this is the favored approach, the type of framing used alters. For 
example, lower levels of reliance may be assumed when information comes from 
foreign entities, in relation to which the U.S. has limited control, suggesting 
greater minimization procedures until information is verified. Alternatively, to 
protect other agencies’ missions, it may suggest limiting intra-governmental 
85 But see Scott D. Sagan, The Problem of the Redundancy Problem:  Why More Nuclear Security 
Forces May Produce Less Nuclear Security, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 935 (2004). 
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 transfer of information. Or, in the interests of privacy, it may mean creating 
higher barriers to obtaining information from a target’s employer, requiring a 
higher showing before a neutral arbiter before obtaining certain records.  
The fifth additional area associated with the manner of collection is location. 
Traditionally, FISA has considered international versus domestic. But the 
possibility of having a mixed category (e.g., where information flows across 
borders), or one focused on the border itself may sharpen the analysis. 
2. Requirements for Approval 
 
Having considered the manner of collection, attention then turns to checks on 
these authorities in the form of what is required for approval prior to the 
collection of the information—essentially, the process that must be followed in 
order for collection to commence. Here, there are four principal considerations: 
the entity(ies) approving the collection, how that entity is constructed, what the 
scope of the approval is, and emergency exceptions. Underlying this demarcation 
is the time-honored understanding that having a neutral arbiter provides an 
important check on the exercise of authority. 
The entity approving collection may be one of three forms. Within the 
executive branch, it may be internal or external to the intelligence agency that has 
been authorized to collect the data. In the judicial realm, there are three types of 
arbiters that may be constructed: a special court (like FISC), an ordinary Article 
III court, or an Article I court. There may, in addition, be a way to construct a 
board or independent arbiter from other sources, such as private industry or 
quasi-governmental organizations. 
The construction of the entity itself also offers numerous options. The 
manner in which decision-makers are selected may include requirements with 
regard to the originating entity (for instance requiring a division among certain 
circuits, regions, or types of industry), as well as the manner of selection (e.g., by 
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, by the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court, by members of the Supreme Court, by the Appellate Courts, 
or by particular committees in Congress). The length of the terms, or their 
progression (e.g., the period of years, staggered terms, and term limits) may also 
be considered. Adversarial processes, in turn, may involve rights of challenge to 
the orders, rights of appeal, third party rights, or the creation of a constitutional 
advocate, while technological expertise similarly may be built into the statutory 
design. 
The scope of approval contributes further to the potential requirements that 
must be met prior to acquisition of information. This category highlights the form 
that the application or request must take, standards that the entity must follow in 
approving or disapproving of the applications, the duration for which 
applications may be granted, and the contours of any requirements for renewal. 
Although not currently required under the statute, depending upon the final 
form of data storage and access, it may be desirable to include an additional 
verification stage—i.e., requirements that must be met by certain actors in 
verifying that the requesting agency has gone through the appropriate steps. 
These may apply to third party data holders, such as telecommunications 
companies, or independent entities established for the purpose of holding the data 
for intelligence purposes. It may be equally relevant for encryption key holders, 
prior to allowing access to the information. 
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 A final area to highlight relates to emergency exceptions that could be 
constructed to take account of national security crises. Three principal areas 
(substantive requirements, the timeline for subsequent approval, and the 
subsequent use of information obtained during the exercise of the emergency 
provisions) provide the focus. Taken together, these various approaches suggest a 
more comprehensive view of ways to provide access to new types of information. 
B. Back-End Framework to Analyze and Use Foreign Intelligence Information  
Like front-end considerations, a range of categories could be used to explore 
the construction of a back-end framework centered on implementation of the 
authorities thereby granted. This framework also divides into two parts, reflective 
of the positive grant of authority and subsequent checks on the same powers, 
even as considerations within each category may consider both aspects as well. 
These realms relate to implementation, on the one hand, and transparency and 
oversight, on the other. (See Figure 3) 
 
BACK-END FRAMEWORK TO ANALYZE AND USE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 
 
Implementation Transparency and Oversight 
1. Analysis 
a. Raw data  
  - type of analysis (e.g., data mining, social 
network analyses) 
  - levels of analysis (e.g., primary, secondary, 
tertiary)  
   - requisite standards and processes to be 
followed 
b. Recombinant information  
  - substantive (e.g., biometric v. biographic) 
  - programmatic (e.g., Sec. 215/Sec. 702) 
  - source (e.g., intra-agency and inter-agency; 
government and private databases) 
c. Verification 
2. Use 
a. Minimization 
b. Judicial processes (e.g., prosecution, use of 
information as evidence in trial, etc.) 
c. Consequential actions (e.g., further targeting, 
watch listing, etc.) 
3. Retention 
a. Length of time 
b. Who holds the information (e.g., NSA, FBI, 
DNI, CIA) 
c. How is the information held (e.g., digital v. 
hard copy, combined with PII or other data v. 
isolated) 
d. Access (e.g., which individuals within 
agency, which agencies, under what 
conditions) 
4. Transfer 
a. To whom 
b. Restrictions on use, access, and sharing 
c. Verification 
 
1. Who reports 
a. Agency executing foreign intelligence 
authorities 
b. IC entity’s Inspector General 
- Administrative (e.g., NSA, NGA, NRO 
IGs) 
- Statutory (e.g., CIA IG, DOJ IG) 
c. IC entity’s privacy officer 
d. Concurrence entity (e.g., NSD) 
e. Approval entity (e.g., FISC) 
f. External Agencies (e.g., ODNI, OMB) 
g. Entities providing the information to the 
IC (e.g., private sector, NGOs) 
h. Independent oversight body (e.g., 
PCLOB) 
2. What is reported 
a. Execution of authorities (e.g., #/range of 
orders, programs, benefits/rates of 
success) 
b. Application under the law (e.g., novel or 
significant legal interpretations, 
application to new technologies) 
c. Noncompliance (willful and non-willful) 
d. Non-standard (specifically requested) 
information 
3. To whom report 
a. Head of agency executing foreign 
intelligence authorities 
b. IC entity’s IG or privacy officer 
c. Concurrence entity 
d. Approval entity 
e. External agencies 
f. Independent bodies (e.g., PCLOB) 
g. Congressional committees 
h. Public 
4. Penalties for violations  
a. Administrative (e.g., reprimand, loss of 
security clearance, suspension, 
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 termination) 
b. Civil (e.g., fines) 
c. Criminal (e.g., prison) 
5. Alternative reporting channels 
a. fraud, waste, abuse (programmatic) 
- path (agency, supervisor, ODNI, 
Congress) 
- protections against recrimination 
b. Public interest (systemic) 
- external body 
- criminal defense (ex post v. ex ante) 
Figure 3 
 
1. Implementation  
Implementation centers on how the authorities granted to the intelligence 
community are actually used. There are four categories to consider: analysis, use, 
retention, and transfer. Traditionally, emphasis has only been placed on the 
second and third areas and, even within these, on only a few components (e.g., 
minimization procedures and the length of time data is retained). The taxonomy 
thus allows more careful scrutiny of different aspects of the implementation 
phase and expands the ways in which Congress could approach each area. 
Under analysis, for instance, a new foreign intelligence framework could 
focus on how raw data is treated. Emphasis on the type of analysis, such as what 
sorts of data mining or social network analyses can be performed could be 
considered, as well as levels of analysis (e.g., primary, secondary, and tertiary 
“hops”). Attention may be drawn to the requisite standards and processes to be 
adopted prior to progressing from one stage to the next.  
Consideration could also focus on what I call “recombinant information”—
namely, the combining of information from different sources in a way that 
generates new knowledge. Attention can be paid to combining substantively 
distinct information, such as biometric and biographic data. It may center on 
programmatic combinations. For instance, agencies may want to combine 
information from different programs run under the same legal authorities (e.g., 
Section 215), or from programs run under different legal authorities (e.g., 
Sections 215 and 702). Alternatively, agencies may want to combine databases 
held in different areas of the agency with databases held outside the agency, or 
government databases with publicly-available databases. Another consideration 
in looking at the analysis of the data centers on information verification. This 
becomes particularly important when subsequent intrusions into civil liberties 
and individual privacy may flow from the initial analyses. This approach would 
help to highlight new and emerging ways in which data analysis is progressing. 
The use of such information also presents an opportunity for statutory 
construction. Minimization procedures have historically been considered (and 
still offer) an opportunity for further inspection. But prosecutorial limits, the use 
of such evidence in trial, and other judicial process-related concerns may be 
taken on board, as well as the extent to which consequences that follow from 
initial analyses, such as further targeting or watch listing, raise civil liberties 
concerns. 
Retention has historically been limited to considerations about time, but there 
are other questions that could also be statutorily addressed. Once obtained (and 
not just at the outset), who should hold the information? Should it be held by the 
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 NSA? The FBI? The CIA? Different government entities have different missions, 
and so the placement of the data is of consequence. Beyond the entity responsible 
for the data, how is the information being held? It may be in digital form or hard 
copy. It may be combined with other data or personal identifiers, or it may be 
isolated. Additionally, access may be considered—not just who has access within 
the intelligence agency in question (e.g., on a need to know basis, by level of 
clearance, or by programmatic assignment), but which other agencies have access 
to the information as well. 
The final consideration relates to transferring the data. This incorporates the 
recipient of the information, further restrictions on use, access, and sharing, and 
ways in which the information may be verified in the future. 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
2. Transparency and Reporting  
The flip side of the design for implementing the authorities granted to the 
intelligence community is considering how such use is to be monitored. As with 
requirements for approval at the front end, this area acts as a counterpoise, 
balancing the power to collect foreign intelligence with protections to prevent 
improper use of the same. It sub-divides into five primary considerations: who 
reports, what is reported, to whom the report is made, penalties for violations, 
and alternative reporting channels. 
The first area, who reports, incorporates entities internal and external to the 
entity exercising the authorities. A good way to think about this area is in terms 
of concentric circles. (See Figure 4) In the core, the specific agency engaged in 
foreign intelligence collection may be required to report. One level out, the IC 
entity’s inspector general may be brought on board. Of relevance is the 
underlying structure of this position—i.e., either administrative (e.g., the current 
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 IGs of the NSA, NGIA, and NRO), or statutorily required (e.g., the current IGs of 
the CIA and DOJ). Additional consideration can be given to reporting 
requirements to the IC entity’s privacy officer. The next ring includes any entities 
required for concurrence at the front-end application or initiation, such as DOJ’s 
National Security Division. The adjoining circle incorporates any entity required 
for approval of the intelligence gathering. This may be FISC, or some other 
entity created for the purpose of addressing the counterpoise to the front-end 
considerations. The following band includes external agencies, which perform 
oversight within the executive branch, such as ODNI, or OMB. The abutting loop 
focuses on entities that provide information to the IC—such as the private sector 
or NGOs. On the outermost ring we then find independent oversight bodies, such 
as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB). 
The question of who reports folds then into the second area, which is what is 
reported. Entities may be required to report on the execution of authorities (e.g., 
the number and range of orders, programs underway, and benefits or rates of 
success). They may address how the programs have been applied under the law, 
detailing novel or significant legal interpretations, or the extension of prior legal 
analysis to new technologies. Noncompliance requirements (either willful or non-
willful) are included here. Finally, of importance will be the manner in which 
non-standard (specifically requested) information will be handled. 
Having looked at who reports and what is reported, the third area to consider 
is to whom such information is made available. For logical reasons, the potential 
list of recipients is to some measure co-extent with the entities considered for 
who makes the report (to ensure access to information necessary for them to 
fulfill their statutory duties). But there are some differences. Thus, reports may 
be required under certain circumstances to (a) the head of the agency executing 
the foreign intelligence authorities, (b) the entity’s inspector general or privacy 
officer, (c) the concurring entity, (d) the approval entity, (e) other executive 
branch agencies, or (f) independent bodies. In addition, (g) Congress, and (h) the 
public may also be considered for receiving reports from the various reporting 
bodies. While the latter reports would necessarily be unclassified, the reports to 
the preceding areas [(a)-(g)] may be either classified or unclassified. 
Crossing the first three categories are questions related to the burden such 
reporting may place on the agencies involved, in terms of time, personnel, and 
money. Special appropriations may be made, for instance, to account for the need 
to develop new technologies to allow for auditing programs, or to hire additional 
analysts to act in an internal capacity. Alternatively, consideration of reporting 
requirements as a whole may help to streamline the overall process. 
The fourth consideration in transparency and oversight focuses on what to do 
about misuse of authorities. Penalties for violations may include administrative 
measures, such as reprimands, loss of security clearances, suspension, or 
termination. Civil remedies such as fines may be created, or criminal measures 
may be attached. 
The fifth and final consideration focuses on what to do when the regular 
reporting channels are not working. How should one conceive of alternative 
reporting channels? Here, there appear to be two divisions. The first, relating to 
fraud, waste, and abuse, tends to be programmatic in that it focuses on specific 
programs in place. Questions to address include (a) the path that individuals 
concerned about fraud, waste, and abuse should follow (e.g., within the agency, 
relating to supervisors, going to ODNI, or approaching congress), as well as (b) 
protections against recrimination. The second division emphasizes public 
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 interest—representing a systemic (not a programmatic) concern about the 
exercise of foreign intelligence gathering authorities. Here, attention may be paid 
to the role of external bodies as well as potential criminal defenses available in 
the event that the matter goes to trial (ex post v. ex ante considerations). 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Public knowledge of PSP has generated widespread calls for FISA reform. 
Proponents of change point to the general approach adopted by Congress in 
passing FISA, the statutory language itself, and Fourth and First Amendment 
constitutional concerns as a basis for introducing alterations.  
The trouble with many of the proposals is that they fail to adopt a fresh start 
to the question of foreign intelligence, instead, looking for fixes to specific 
problems. The quandary, however, is much bigger than, for instance, the lack of 
adversarial counsel, or the five year retention of data by the NSA. The problem is 
that technology has radically altered, and the approach on which FISA rests, 
centered on targets and geography, is now woefully inadequate for the world in 
which we now live.  
It is for this reason that this Article has sought to look at how technology 
itself has altered since 1978, in terms of the types of information that are now 
available (i.e., personal, transactional, relational, locational, and content) and in 
the methods by which such information can be accessed, transmitted, and stored 
(namely, observation, communications networks, papers, hard drives and stand-
alone devices, remote servers and cloud technologies, and social media).  
Using these divisions as a basis for the first part of the front-end framework, 
the proposed taxonomy builds on them to add considerations related to the form 
in which such information is transferred, the agency seeking the information, the 
target about whom information is sought, and the source and location of 
information. Set against the manner of collection at the front-end, are the 
requirements for approval. Here, the entity approving the collection, the 
construction of that entity, the scope of the approval to be granted, potential 
verification regimes, and exceptions in times of emergency may be considered.  
For the back-end framework to analyze and use foreign intelligence 
information, implementation divides into four primary areas: analysis, use, 
retention, and transfer. The check on these authorities primarily takes the form of 
transparency and oversight, which further sub-divided into five areas: who 
reports, what is reported, to whom they report, penalties for violations, and 
alternative reporting channels. 
While the taxonomy does not represent a radical re-conception of 
intelligence collection, it does expand the scope of the current reform efforts 
addressed in Part II to include the range of potential areas that could be brought 
on board. In doing so, it builds on the country’s experience over the past 36 years 
even as it recognizes changed circumstances. Although the Article takes no 
normative position on the specific reforms to be given effect, it clarifies areas 
critical for discussion and, in so doing, their complex relationship with other 
elements in the framework. The hope is that the taxonomy may serve as a way to 
move the conversation forward in developing an approach to foreign intelligence 
gathering that is cognizant of the need to obtain foreign intelligence, even as it 
recognizes the changing privacy interests implicated by new and emerging 
technologies. 
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